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The predominant role of signal precision







The weight assigned to public information in Keynesian beauty contest depends on
the signal precision and on the degree of strategic complementarities. This experimen-
tal study shows that the response of subjects to changes in the signal precision and in
the degree of strategic complementarities is qualitatively consistent with theoretical
predictions, though quantitatively weaker. The weaker subjects’ response to changes
in the signal precision, however, mainly drives the weight observed in the experiment,
making strategic complementarities and overreaction an issue of second order.
JEL classification: C92, D82, D84, E58.
Keywords: heterogeneous information, beauty contest, experiment, public information.
1 Introduction
In coordination games under heterogeneous information, public information plays a double
role. While public information conveys information about economic fundamentals, it also
conveys strategic information because it is common knowledge among all market partic-
ipants. Fundamental uncertainty is driven by the signal precision, strategic uncertainty
by the degree of strategic complementarities. The weight assigned to public information
in equilibrium, thus, depends both on the signal precision and on the degree of strategic
complementarities. As shown by Morris and Shin (2002), the coordination motive leads
∗The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the
Swiss National Bank. We are grateful to the ANR-DFG joint grant for financial support (ANR-12-FRAL-
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†Swiss National Bank, Boersenstrasse 15, 8022 Zurich, Switzerland; email: Romain.Baeriswyl@snb.ch.
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agents to overreact to public information in the sense that the equilibrium weight assigned
to it is larger than what can be justified by its information about fundamentals.
Several studies have identified the occurrence of overreaction in laboratory experi-
ments. For instance, the experimental analysis by Cornand and Heinemann (2014) mea-
sures subjects’ overreaction to public information when varying the degree of strategic
complementarities. However, while the role of the precision of public signal is as essential
as strategic complementarities for the determination of equilibrium weight, it has hardly
been studied. This paper fills this gap.
We run an experiment built on the beauty contest game of Morris and Shin (2002). In
this game, agents have to choose actions that are as close as possible to a fundamental and
as close as possible to the actions of others. To decide on their actions, agents receive a
public and a private signal on the fundamental. The equilibrium weight assigned to public
information increases with both its precision and the degree of strategic complementarities.
We test predictions of this beauty contest game when varying the precision of public
information and the degree of strategic complementarities.
In line with theory, the weight assigned to public information increases with its pre-
cision both in the first-order expectation of the fundamental and in the beauty contest
action. However, compared to theoretical predictions, subjects underweight precise public
signals and overweight imprecise public signals both in the first-order expectation of the
fundamental and in the beauty contest action. In other words, subjects are less sensitive
to signal precision than theory predicts, as already highlighted by Ackert et al. (2004).1
For a given precision, the weight on the public signal in the first-order expectation of the
fundamental is always lower than the weight in the beauty contest action, indicating that
strategic complementarities induce subjects to overreact to public information. Compared
to the weight on the public signal in the first-order expectation, the overreaction in the
beauty contest is weaker than theoretically predicted, which is consistent with Nagel (1995)
or Cornand and Heinemann (2014). In short, whereas the response of subjects to changes
in the signal precision and in the degree of strategic complementarities is qualitatively
consistent with theoretical predictions, it is quantitatively weaker.
Interestingly, the weaker subjects’ response to changes in the signal precision makes
strategic complementarities and overreaction an issue of second order. Because subjects
underweight precise public information, the weight assigned to it both in the first-order
expectation of the fundamental and in the beauty contest action is lower than the the-
oretical weight in the first-order expectation. Respectively, because subjects overweight
imprecise public information, the weight assigned to it both in the first-order expectation
and in the beauty contest action is higher than the theoretical weight in the beauty contest
action. This suggests that the issue of overweighting/underweighting imprecise/precise in-
formation matters more than overreaction to common knowledge information.
This paper contributes to a growing experimental literature related to the effects of
1Ackert et al. (2004), however, analyse an experimental financial market with trading and do not account
for overreaction issues due to strategic complementarities, which are typical in beauty contest games.
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public vs. private information in games with strategic complementarities.2 Cornand
and Heinemann (2014) are the first to render account for overreaction to public signals.
Baeriswyl and Cornand (2014) test the effectiveness of two communication strategies –
partial publicity consisting in disclosing transparent information as a semi-public signal
to a fraction of market participants only and partial transparency consisting in disclosing
ambiguous public information to all market participants – to reduce market overreaction.
Shapiro et al. (2014) show that the predictive power of the level-k reasoning approach
is related to the strength of the coordination motive and the symmetry of information.
None of these papers focuses on the role of information precision. To our knowledge, Dale
and Morgan (2012) are the first to analyze the impact of signals’ precision. They show
that the quality of decisions increases with the addition of a lower quality private signal.
However, subjects place inefficiently high weight on poorly accurate public signal, which
is welfare damaging.3 Our design is different as we always have public and private signals
and only vary the precision of public information. This characteristic allows us to assess
how subjects respond to pure changes in the precision of public information.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
framework and section 3 the experiment. Results are stated in section 4. Section 5
discusses the results in terms of policy implications and concludes.
2 The theoretical model
The spirit of the Keynesian beauty contest is characterized by strategic complementarities
in agents’ decision rule: each agent takes its decision not only according to its expectation
of economic fundamentals but also according to its expectation of other agents’ decision.
The utility function for agent i is given by:
ui(ai, θ) ≡ −(1− r)(ai − θ)2 − r(ai − a−i)2, (1)
where θ is the fundamental, ai is the action taken by agent i, and a−i is the average action
taken by other agents −i, and r is a constant. Maximizing utility yields the optimal action
of agent i :
ai = (1− r)Ei(θ) + rEi(a−i).
The parameter r is the weight assigned to the strategic component which drives the
strength of the coordination motive in the decision rule. Assuming 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 implies
2Among coordination games with heterogeneous information, the theory of global games has been
experimentally tested by Cabrales et al. (2007) who show that the behavior of subjects converges to the
theoretical prediction and explain this behavior by learning and risk dominance. Heinemann et al. (2004)
and Heinemann et al. (2009) analyze the role of public and private information in the speculative attack
game. They show that the global game equilibrium selection device is useful to predict behavior. Here, we
focus on tests of the Morris and Shin (2002) model.
3While the aforementioned literature does not consider trading, there is some experimental evidence
about the role of public and private signals on market efficiency in aggregating private information into
prices (see e.g. Ackert et al. (2004), Alfarano et al. (2011) and Middeldorp and Rosenkranz (2011)).
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that decisions are strategic complements: agents tend to align their decision with those
of others.4 Following the insight of Morris and Shin (2002) (henceforth MS), the op-
timal action in the Keynesian beauty contest is derived under imperfect, heterogenous,
information.
2.1 Information structure
Each agent i receives a private signal xi and a public signal y. These signals deviate from
the fundamental θ by some error terms with uniform distribution. Whereas the private
signal xi = θ + i with i ∼ U [−µ,+µ] is different for each agent i, the public signal
y = θ+ η with η ∼ U [−µη,+µη] is the same for all agents and common knowledge among
them. Noise terms i of distinct agents and the noise η of the public signal are independent
and their distribution is treated as exogenously given.
2.2 Equilibrium
To derive the perfect Bayesian equilibrium action of agents, we express the first-order
expectation of agent i about the fundamental θ conditional on its private and public
information. With error terms uniformly distributed, this corresponds to the middle of
the intersection of the intervals [xi − µ, xi + µ] and [y − µη, y + µη], and yields
E(θ|xi, y) = max{xi − µ; y − µη}+ min{xi + µ; y + µη}
2
= (1− fi) · xi + fi · y. (2)
The weight assigned to the public signal y in the first-order expectation, fi, is dependent
on the signal draw. The average first-order conditional expectation of agents about the
fundamental θ is written as
E¯(θ) = (1− f) · x¯+ f · y. (3)
f represents the average weight assigned to y when each agent estimates θ according to
(2). Values of f will be numerically calculated for a large number of draws.
We express the average optimal action as a linear combination of the average private
signal and the public signal:
a¯ = (1− w)x¯+ wy = (1− r)E¯(θ) + rE¯(a¯)
= (1− r)E¯(θ) + r(1− w)E¯(θ) + rwy = (1− rw)E¯(θ) + rwy
= (1− rw)((1− f) · x¯+ f · y) + rw · y = (1− r)(1− f)




1− r(1− f)︸ ︷︷ ︸
w
y. (4)
4Such an optimal decision rule could be derived from various economic contexts. For example, Amato
et al. (2002), Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009), and Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010) interpret the beauty
contest as the price-setting rule of monopolistically competitive firms; Angeletos and Pavan (2004) as the
investment decision rule of competing firms.
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The overreaction in the sense of MS is characterized by the fact that the weight assigned
to the public signal y in the optimal action is larger than in the first-order expectation:
w = f/(1− r(1− f)) > f . Relying on the average optimal action (4), the optimal action
of agents i yields
ai = (1− r)E(θ|xi, y) + rE(a¯|xi, y) = ((1− r) + r(1− w))E(θ|xi, y) + rw · y
= (1− rw)E(θ|xi, y) + rw · y = (1− rw)(1− fi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−wi
xi + ((1− rw)fi + rw)︸ ︷︷ ︸
wi
y, (5)
where E(θ|xi, y) and fi are given by (2). It can be shown that the average individual
weight on y, w¯i, is equal to w in (4).
3 The experiment
To analyze the role of the precision of signals in the coordination game, we run an exper-
iment with three treatments, each corresponding to a different degree of relative precision
of the private and public signals.
3.1 Experimental procedure
We conducted 6 sessions with a total of 108 participants. Sessions were run at the RE-
GATE lab in Lyon. Participants were mainly students from Lyon University, the engi-
neering school Ecole Centrale Lyon and EM Lyon business school. In each session, the 18
participants were separated into three independent groups of 6 participants. Each partici-
pant could only participate in one session. Each session consisted of three stages, composed
of 10 periods each (thus a total of 30 periods per session). Each stage corresponded to a
different treatment. Participants played within the same group of participants during the
whole length of the experiment and did not know the identity of the other participants of
their group. Subjects were seated in random order at PCs. Instructions were then read
aloud and questions answered in private. Throughout the sessions, participants were not
allowed to communicate with one another and could not see each others’ screens. Before
starting the experiment, participants were required to answer a few questions to ascer-
tain their understanding of the rules. The experiment started after all participants had
given the correct answers to these questions. Examples of instructions, questionnaire and
screens are given in the Appendix.
The program was written using z-Tree experimental software (Fischbacher (2007)).
3.2 Treatment parameters and theoretical predictions
In every period and for each group, a fundamental state θ is drawn randomly using a
uniform distribution from the interval [50, 950].5 In every period of the experiment, each
5This interval was not told to participants.
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subject has to make two decisions:
1. Each subject forms its best expectation ei about the fundamental θ (decision 1).
The payoff function in ECU (experimental currency units) for subject i related to
his estimation is given by
u(ei, θ) = 200− (ei − θ)2.
2. Each subject decides on an action ai in the beauty contest (decision 2). The payoff
function in ECU for subject i is given by
u(ai, a−i, θ) = 400− 1.5(ai − θ)2 − 8.5(ai − a−i)2,
in sessions 1 to 4 and by
u(ai, a−i, θ) = 350− (ai − θ)2 − (ai − a−i)2,
in sessions 5 and 6, where a−i is the average action of other subjects of the same
group.
To make their decisions, subjects receive some signals on the fundamental θ and are
forced to choose as decisions a weighted average of the signals they get.6
After each period, subjects were informed about the true state, their partner’s decision
and their payoff. Information about past periods from the same stage (including signals
and own decisions) was displayed during the decision phase on the lower part of the screen.
At the end of each session, the ECU earned were summed up and converted into euros.
1000 ECU were converted to 2 euros.7
The parameters choice for the experiment is summarized in Table 1. Column tf shows
the average optimal weight assigned to the public signal in decision 1 (the first-order
expectation of the fundamental θ) and column tw shows the average optimal equilibrium
weight in decision 2 (the beauty contest).
Each subject receives both a public and a private signal as described in Section 2.1.
The private signal received by each subject is distributed as xi ∼ U [θ − 10, θ + 10]. The
distribution of the public signal differs depending on the treatment. As reported in Table
1, the order of play is different in sessions 1, 2, 5, and 6 from that in sessions 3 and 4. In
sessions 1, 2, 5, and 6, the common (public) signal is drawn from y ∼ U [θ − 5, θ + 5] in
stage 2 and from y ∼ U [θ−20, θ+20] in stage 3. In sessions 3 and 4, the common (public)
signal is drawn from y ∈ [θ− 20, θ+ 20] in stage 2 and from y ∼ U [θ− 5, θ+ 5] in stage 3.
6Concretely, subjects click on values inside the interval defined by their signals to determine their chosen
action. By doing so, we restrain subjects from choosing actions outside of their signals interval.
7In all stages, it was possible to earn negative points. Realized losses were of a size that could be
counterbalanced by positive payoffs within a few periods. In total, no subject earned a negative payoff in
any session.
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Sessions Groups Players Stage Periods r µ µη tf tw
1-2 1-6 6 1 10 0.85 10 10 0.50 0.87
2 10 0.85 10 5 0.91 0.98
3 10 0.85 10 20 0.09 0.39
3-4 7-12 6 1 10 0.85 10 10 0.50 0.87
2 10 0.85 10 20 0.09 0.39
3 10 0.85 10 5 0.91 0.98
5-6 13-18 6 1 10 0.5 10 10 0.50 0.67
2 10 0.5 10 5 0.91 0.95
3 10 0.5 10 20 0.09 0.16
Table 1: Experiment parameters, average optimal weight on y in decisions 1 (tf) and 2
(tw)
4 The results
The observed average weight assigned in the experiment to the public signal in decision
1 (ofobs) is reported in Table 2, while the observed average weight assigned to the public
signal in decision 2 (owobs) is reported in Table 3. tfcond and twcond denote the theoretical
weight conditional on the realization of signals in the experiment. tfuncond and twuncond
denote the theoretical weight unconditional on the realization of signals. Figure 1 compares
the observed average weight assigned to the public signal in decisions 1 (of) and 2 (ow) to
their optimal unconditional value for each treatment over 10 periods. Figure 2 compares
the observed average weight assigned to the public signal in decision 1 (of) to the observed
average weight in decision 2 (ow), and the observed average weight in decision 2 with
r = 0.85 to that with r = 0.5.
To study the effect of the precision of public information, we analyze experimental data
by looking at stated first-order expectations, overreaction effects, decision in the beauty
contest, and change in the degree of strategic complementarities. Statistical tests are
based on Mann-Whitney U-tests when comparing observed data to theoretical predictions
and on Mann-Whitney two-samples statistic for between treatment tests. The fact that
we cannot detect order effect8 allows us to pool data from groups 1 to 12 together for the
remaining analysis.9
4.1 Effect of information precision on the first-order expectation
We analyze the formation of the first-order expectation when beliefs are stated directly as
in decision 1, the first-order expectation on the fundamental. We compare the observed
weight (of) in each treatment to its theoretical prediction (tfcond in Table 2) before ana-
lyzing the impact of a change in the precision of the public signal.
8The observed weight assigned to the public signal by groups 1-6 in decision 1 and decision 2 is not
different from that assigned by groups 7-12 when µη = 10 (p = 0.6310 and p = 0.6741), when µη = 5
(p = 0.2002 and p = 0.2489) and when µη = 20 (p = 0.3367 and p = 0.1730).
9As Figures 1 and 2 show, there do not seem to be any convergence effects (as is standard in laboratory
experiments on games with strategic complementarities).
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Figure 1: Average weight assigned to the public signal in decision 1 f (first-order expec-
tation) and in decision 2 w (beauty contest)7
Figure 2: Average weight assigned to the public signal in decision 1 f (first-order expec-
tation) and in decision 2 w (beauty contest)8
Sessions Groups µη = 10 µη = 5 µη = 20
ofobs tfcond ofobs tfcond ofobs tfcond
1 1 .54 .50 .77 .90 .33 .12
1 2 .46 .50 .65 .89 .31 .09
1 3 .48 .50 .76 .89 .30 .11
2 4 .48 .50 .70 .90 .41 .07
2 5 .53 .50 .73 .89 .44 .07
2 6 .53 .50 .71 .87 .30 .07
3 7 .52 .50 .64 .89 .43 .09
3 8 .51 .50 .81 .90 .35 .18
3 9 .51 .50 .71 .90 .36 .08
4 10 .45 .50 .83 .90 .32 .12
4 11 .50 .50 .78 .90 .36 .08
4 12 .51 .50 .81 .89 .37 .14
5 13 .52 .50 .77 .91 .34 .11
5 14 .54 .50 .72 .90 .37 .08
5 15 .56 .50 .59 .91 .39 .12
6 16 .49 .50 .77 .89 .41 .11
6 17 .48 .50 .61 .91 .32 .08
6 18 .50 .50 .62 .88 .39 .10
Average 1-18 .51 .50 .72 .90 .36 .10
tfuncond 13-18 .50 .91 .09
Table 2: Average weight on y in the expectation of the fundamental (decision 1)
4.1.1 Observed behavior vs. theory
The weight of put by subjects on the public signal does not significantly differ from the
theoretical prediction (0.5) when µη = 10 (p = 0.3125 for groups 1-12 and p = 0.6892 for
groups 13-18). By contrast, when the public signal and the private signal are not of equal
precision, the observed weight significantly differs from theoretical predictions, although
subjects tend to put a higher weight on the signal that is more precise and a lower weight
on the signal that is less precise. In other words, the effect of the precision of the public
signal is less pronounced in the first-order expectation than theoretically predicted. This
is consistent with the findings of Ackert et al. (2004).
The observed weight assigned to the public signal of is significantly below its theo-
retical value in treatment µη = 5 (p = 0.0000 for groups 1-12 and p = 0.0051 for groups
13-18) and significantly above its theoretical value in treatment µη = 20 (p = 0.0000 for
groups 1-12 and p = 0.0051 for groups 13-18). Nevertheless, the weight of put on the
public signal increases with its precision: one can reject the equality of weights between
treatments µη = 10 and µη = 5 (p = 0.0000 for groups 1-12 and p = 0.0039 for groups 13-
18), between treatments µη = 10 and µη = 20 (p = 0.0000 for groups 1-12 and p = 0.0039
for groups 13-18), and between treatments µη = 5 and µη = 20 (p = 0.0000 for groups
1-12 and p = 0.0039 for groups 13-18).
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Sessions Groups µη = 10 µη = 5 µη = 20
owobs twcond owobs twcond owobs twcond
1 1 .73 .87 .82 .98 .53 .42
1 2 .70 .87 .83 .98 .61 .40
1 3 .88 .87 .96 .98 .67 .41
2 4 .63 .87 .81 .98 .58 .38
2 5 .81 .87 .96 .98 .80 .38
2 6 .79 .87 .87 .98 .78 .38
3 7 .70 .87 .73 .98 .61 .40
3 8 .82 .87 .86 .98 .58 .46
3 9 .76 .87 .84 .98 .70 .39
4 10 .74 .87 .91 .98 .47 .42
4 11 .78 .87 .85 .98 .51 .39
4 12 .65 .87 .83 .98 .45 .43
Average 1-12 .75 .87 .86 .98 .61 .41
twuncond 1-12 .87 .99 .39
5 13 .67 .67 .79 .95 .44 .18
5 14 .72 .67 .81 .95 .50 .15
5 15 .57 .67 .66 .95 .43 .19
6 16 .65 .67 .76 .94 .45 .18
6 17 .67 .67 .72 .95 .50 .16
6 18 .70 .67 .75 .94 .54 .17
Average 13-18 .66 .67 .75 .95 .48 .17
twuncond 13-18 .67 .95 .16
Table 3: Average weight on y in the beauty contest (decision 2)
4.1.2 Asymmetric response
The theoretical weights assigned to the public signal in the treatments µη = 5 (0.91) and
µη = 20 (0.09) are symmetrically spread around the weight in treatment µη = 10 (0.5),
as reported in Table 2. However, subjects do not symmetrically respond to an increase
and to a decrease in the precision of the public signal in forming their expectation on the
fundamental. The difference between treatments µη = 10 and µη = 5 is significantly larger
in absolute value than the difference between treatments µη = 10 and µη = 20. The effect
of less precise public signal is weaker than that of more precise public signal.
Table 4 (columns 2 and 3) computes the ratios between the difference of the observed
weights in two treatments (ofµη=10 − ofµη=5, for instance) and the difference of the theo-
retical weights in the same treatments (tfµη=10 − tfµη=5). A ratio lower than 1 indicates
that the effect of increasing or decreasing the precision of the public signal is weaker than
predicted by theory. The ratio for the treatments µη = 5 vs. µη = 10 is significantly
larger than for the treatments µη = 20 vs. µη = 10 (p = 0.6312), meaning that subjects
underweight less the public signal when it is more precise than they overweight it when it















1 0.58 0.55 0.80 0.45 1.26 1.66
2 0.49 0.37 1.10 0.19 1.67 0.87
3 0.71 0.47 0.73 0.44 0.87 1.65
4 0.53 0.17 1.59 0.10 2.37 1.22
5 0.52 0.21 1.33 0.02 2.28 0.19
6 0.47 0.54 0.70 0.03 1.32 0.11
7 0.30 0.22 0.30 0.19 0.78 2.03
8 0.73 0.50 0.32 0.57 0.41 2.58
9 0.48 0.37 0.68 0.13 1.19 0.75
10 0.95 0.36 1.50 0.59 1.38 2.88
11 0.70 0.36 0.69 0.57 0.88 3.16
12 0.76 0.38 1.54 0.45 1.90 2.64
13 0.62 0.44 0.40 0.47 0.61 1.36
14 0.46 0.40 0.32 0.43 0.65 1.35
15 0.08 0.43 0.30 0.30 3.14 0.95
16 0.73 0.21 0.39 0.41 0.50 2.55
17 0.33 0.38 0.19 0.32 0.47 1.01
18 0.32 0.27 0.20 0.31 0.54 1.48
Av. 0.54 0.37 0.73 0.33 1.24 1.58
Table 4: Differences between observed weight for treatments µη = 10 and µη = 5 and for
treatments µη = 10 and µη = 20 normalized by their respective theoretical values tf and
tw
4.1.3 Payoff incentives
Can payoff incentives be responsible for the fact that the difference between the observed
weight of and the theoretical weight tf is larger in treatment µη = 20 than in treatment
µη = 5? The answer is no. Figure 3 represents the expected payoff as a function of
deviation from the optimal weight conditional on signals. It shows that deviating from
the optimal weight is more costly when µη = 20 than when µη = 5. According to payoff
incentives, one would expect subjects to deviate less from optimal weight with a less precise
signal than with a more precise one.
An alternative explanation for the asymmetric response may be associated with the
stronger level of uncertainty that prevails when µη = 20 compared to µη = 5. Under
stronger uncertainty, it seems that subjects prefer to avoid playing extreme values. The
relative frequency of weights depicted on Figure 4 shows that subjects more often play
the middle of the signals’ interval when µη = 20 than when µη = 5. While uncertainty
should provide incentives for subjects to play extreme values, it rather seems to prevent
them from doing so.
Result 1 - When subjects form expectation on some fundamental value, they
put more weight on more precise signals. The effect of precision is, however,
less pronounced than theoretically predicted. Moreover, subjects underweight
11
Figure 3: Expected payoff as function of deviation from optimal weight
12
precise information less than they overweight imprecise information.
Figure 4: Relative frequency of weight assigned to the public signal in decision 1 (first-
order expectation); dashed line: uncond. optimal weight; solid line: observed average
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4.2 Overreaction
Following the literature in the vein of Morris and Shin (2002), overreaction consists in the
fact that the equilibrium weight assigned to the public signal in the beauty contest (w)
is larger than in the first-order expectation of the fundamental (f). In an experiment,
overreaction can be assessed either against the theoretical weight or against the observed
weight assigned to the public signal in the first-order expectation. We first discuss over-
reaction in ow against the theoretical weight tw and then against the observed weight
of .
4.2.1 Overreaction to theoretical weight in the first-order expectation
The observed weight assigned to the public signal in the beauty contest is significantly
higher than the theoretical weight in the first-order expectation of the fundamental in
treatments µη = 10 (p = 0.0000 for groups 1-12, p = 0.0051 for groups 13-18) and µη = 20
(p = 0.0000 for groups 1-12, p = 0.0051 for groups 13-18). Subjects clearly overreact in
treatments µη = 10 and µη = 20. By contrast, they underreact in treatment µη = 5, in the
sense that the weight on y in the beauty contest is systematically below the theoretical
weight in the first-order expectation of the fundamental (p = 0.0434 for groups 1-12,
p = 0.0051 for groups 13-18). In short, subjects overreact when the public signal is rather
imprecise, while they underreact to it when it is rather precise.
When overreaction is observed, it is weaker than equilibrium theory predicts – as
already observed in Baeriswyl and Cornand (2014) and Cornand and Heinemann (2014)
– except in treatment µη = 10 for groups 13-18 where equality cannot be rejected.
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Overreaction can be assessed in terms of limited levels of reasoning. Starting from the
definition of level-1, actions for higher levels of reasoning can be calculated as follows.
Suppose that the players −i (all players except i) attach weight ρk to the public signal.
The best response of player i to such behaviour is
ak+1i = (1− rρk)Ei(θ) + rρky
= (1− rρk)[(1− fi)xi + fiy] + rρky
= xi[(1− rρk)(1− fi)] + y [(1− rρk)fi + rρk]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρk+1
. (6)
Hence the weight on the public signal for the next level of reasoning is
ρk+1 = fi + ρkr(1− fi). (7)
While level-1 reasoning corresponds to the first-order expectation of the fundamental (tf),
the infinite level of reasoning corresponds to the equilibrium action in the beauty contest
(tw). Table 5 presents the theoretical weights for limited levels of reasoning when level-1
10µη = 10: p = 0.0006 for groups 1-12, p = 0.9362 for groups 13-18; µη = 5: p = 0.0000 for groups 1-12,
p = 0.0051 for groups 13-18; µη = 20: p = 0.0000 for groups 1-12, p = 0.0051 for groups 13-18.
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Treatment µη = 5 µη = 10 µη = 20
Groups 1-12 13-18 1-12 13-18 1-12 13-18
Theoretical .91 .91 .50 .50 .09 .09
level-1 (.0434) (.0051) (.0000) (.0051) (.0000) (.0051)
rejected rejected rejected rejected rejected rejected
Level-2 .98 .95 .71 .62 .16 .13
(p-value) (.0000) (.0051) (.1387) (.0403) (.0000) (.0051)
rejected rejected accepted rejected rejected rejected
Level-3 .98 .95 .80 .66 .21 .15
(p-value) (.0000) (.0051) (.0263) (.3051) (.0000) (.0051)
rejected rejected rejected accepted rejected rejected
Level-4 .98 .95 .84 .66 .25 .16
(p-value) (.0000) (.0051) (.0002) (.3051) (.0000) (.0051)
rejected rejected rejected accepted rejected rejected
Level-5 .98 .95 .86 .67 .29 .16
(p-value) (.0000) (.0051) (.0002) (.3051) (.0000) (.0051)
rejected rejected rejected accepted rejected rejected
Level-6 .98 .95 .86 .67 .31 .16
(p-value) (.0000) (.0051) (.0002) (.3051) (.0000) (.0051)
rejected rejected rejected accepted rejected rejected
Level-∞ .98 .95 .87 .67 .39 .16
(p-value) (.0000) (.0051) (.0002) (.3051) (.0000) (.0051)
rejected rejected rejected accepted rejected rejected
Obs. weight .8562 .7489 .7497 .6646 .6090 .4794
Table 5: Theoretical values of weights put on y for different levels of reasoning and starting
with level-1 as the theoretical weight on y in the first-order expectation of the fundamental
is the theoretical weight in the first-order expectation.
In treatment µη = 10, the observed weight corresponds to level-2 reasoning when
r = 0.85 and to level-∞ when r = 0.5. The level of reasoning observed when r = 0.85 is
consistent with the result of Nagel (1995), Baeriswyl and Cornand (2014) and Cornand
and Heinemann (2014). In treatment µη = 5, the observed weight does not correspond to
any level of reasoning because it is lower than the theoretical weight in level-1 reasoning.
In treatment µη = 20, the observed weight does not correspond to any level of reasoning
because it is higher than the theoretical weight in level-∞ reasoning.
4.2.2 Overreaction to observed weight in the first-order expectation
Compared to the observed weight in the first-order expectation, however, there is overreac-
tion for each level of precision: the observed weight ow is always larger than the observed
weight of .11
Table 6 presents the values for limited level of reasoning when level-1 is defined as
11In treatment µη = 10: p = 0.0000 for groups 1-12, p = 0.0051 for groups 13-18; in treatment µη = 5:
p = 0.0006 for groups 1-12, p = 0.0658 for groups 13-18; µη = 20: p = 0.0000 for groups 1-12, p = 0.0051
for groups 13-18.
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Treatment µη = 5 µη = 10 µη = 20
Groups 1-12 13-18 1-12 13-18 1-12 13-18
Observed .74 .68 .50 .51 .36 .37
level-1 (.0006) (.0658) (.0000) (.0051) (.0000) (.0051)
rejected accepted rejected rejected rejected rejected
Level-2 .90 .79 .71 .63 .56 .49
(p-value) (.0404) (.1738) (.1738) (.0658) (.1738) (.9362)
rejected accepted accepted accepted accepted accepted
Level-3 .94 .81 .80 .66 .66 .52
(p-value) (.0061) (.0203) (.0404) (.3789) (.1738) (.0658)
rejected rejected rejected accepted accepted accepted
Level-4 .95 .81 .84 .67 .72 .53
(p-value) (.0061) (.0203) (.0006) (.9362) (.0061) (.0658)
rejected rejected rejected accepted rejected accepted
Level-5 .95 .81 .86 .67 .75 .54
(p-value) (.0061) (.0203) (.0006) (.9362) (.0061) (.0203)
rejected rejected rejected accepted rejected rejected
Level-6 .95 .81 .86 .67 .77 .54
(p-value) (.0061) (.0203) (.0006) (.9362) (.0061) (.0203)
rejected rejected rejected accepted rejected rejected
Level-∞ .95 .81 .87 .67 .79 .54
(p-value) (.0061) (.0203) (.0006) (.9362) (.0006) (.0203)
rejected rejected rejected accepted rejected rejected
Obs. weight .86 .75 .75 .66 .61 .48
Table 6: Theoretical values of weights put on y for different levels of reasoning and starting
with level-1 as the observed weight on y in decision 1
the observed weight of rather than the theoretical weight tf . The overreaction is not
as strong as predicted by the infinite level of reasoning, when the observed weight in
the first-order expectation is taken as level-1 reasoning, except for µη = 10 groups 13-18
where equality cannot be rejected (see also Figure 1). Subjects generally reach a level of
reasoning between 1 and 4, depending on the treatment.
Result 2 - Compared to the weight observed in the first-order expectation,
subjects overreact to public information in the beauty contest decision. The
overreaction is however weaker than theoretically predicted. Compared to
theory, there is no systematic overreaction because the overreaction relative
to the observed first-order expectation may be dominated by the fact that
subjects underweight precise information.
4.3 Effect of information precision on the beauty contest
We compare the observed weight in the beauty contest (ow) in each treatment to its
theoretical prediction (tw) before analyzing the impact of a change in the precision of the
public signal.
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4.3.1 Observed behavior vs. theory
As in the first-order expectation, the precision of the public signal has a clear effect on
the weight assigned to it in the beauty contest. The weight assigned to the public signal
increases with its precision. The observed weight assigned to the public signal by groups
1-12 (respectively 13-18) in treatment µη = 10 is significantly below the observed weight
in treatment µη = 5 (p = 0.0015, respectively p = 0.0304) and significantly above the
observed weight in treatment µη = 20 (p = 0.0039, respectively p = 0.0039).
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4.3.2 Asymmetric response
As in the first-order expectation, subjects asymmetrically respond to an increase in the
precision of the public signal and a decrease in the precision of the public signal in their
beauty contest decision (ow). This can be shown owing to the ratio between the differ-
ence of the observed weights in two treatments (owµη=10 − owµη=5, for instance) and the
difference of the theoretical weights in the same treatments (twµη=10 − twµη=5), as shown
on Table 4 (columns 4 and 5). A ratio lower than 1 indicates that the effect of increasing
or decreasing the precision of the public signal is weaker than predicted by theory.
The ratio for the treatments µη = 10 vs. µη = 5 is significantly larger than for the
treatments µη = 10 vs. µη = 20 (p = 0.0164), indicating that subjects less underweight
the public signal when it is more precise than they overweight it when it is less precise
than the private signal.
However, when we account for the asymmetry observed in the first-order expectation
(as stated in Result 1), there is no asymmetry in the way the precision influences the
weight in the beauty contest ow. This is shown by computing the ratio between the
difference of the observed weights in two treatments (owµη=10− owµη=5, for instance) and
the difference of the theoretical weight conditional on the observed first-order expectation
(tw|ofµ=10 − tw|ofµ=5), as done in Table 4 (columns 6 and 7). This corresponds exactly
to what we observe in the analysis of limited level of reasoning.
Result 3 - Once accounting for the asymmetry in the observed weight put
on the public signal in the first-order expectation, there is no asymmetric
response in the weight put on the public signal in the beauty contest decision.
4.3.3 Payoff incentives
As for the analysis of the stated first-order expectations in section 4.1, payoff incentives
as depicted in Figure 3 cannot rationalize the asymmetric response in the observed weight
put on the public signal in treatment µη = 20 vs. µη = 5. However, as shown on Figures 5
and 6, the coordination motive in the beauty contest leads them to play focal points more
12We also check that the observed weight assigned to the public signal by groups 1-12 (respectively 13-
18) in treatment µη = 5 is significantly different from that in treatment µη = 20 (p = 0.0001, respectively
p = 0.0039).
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Figure 5: Relative frequency of weight assigned to the public signal in decision 2 (the
action); dashed line: uncond. optimal weight; solid line: observed average
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Figure 6: Relative frequency of weight assigned to the public signal in decision 2 (the
action); dashed line: uncond. optimal weight; solid line: observed average
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often. While Figure 4 exhibits no focal point for decision 1 (except in µη = 10, where it
coincides with the equilibrium value), we can identify clear focal points on Figures 5 and
6. In treatment µη = 5, 1 represents a focal point for groups 1-12, while 1 and 0.5 are focal
for groups 13-18. In treatment µη = 20, 0.5 is a focal point. In treatment µη = 10, both 1
and 0.5 are focal for groups 1-12, while only 0.5 is focal for groups 13-18. The combination
of uncertainty and strategic complementarity (so strategic uncertainty) seems to induce
subjects to play focal points.
4.4 Change in the degree of strategic complementarities
In line with theory and with the findings of Cornand and Heinemann (2014), the reaction
to public information is reinforced with a stronger degree of strategic complementarities.
As can been seen on Figure 2 (panel 3), a change in r has a significant effect in the beauty
contest: the observed weight assigned to the public signal in periods 1-10 for groups 1-12
is significantly higher than that observed for groups 13-18 for treatments µη = 5, µη = 10
and µη = 20 (p = 0.0002 in all three cases).
13 The comparison between Figures 5 and 6
shows that as the degree of strategic complementarities r increases, subjects more often
play focal points.
Result 4 - In line with theory, as the degree of strategic complementarities
increases, the weight put on the public signal in the beauty contest decision
increases.
5 Discussion and conclusion
Whereas the market response to public disclosure depends on both the signal precision and
the degree of strategic complementarities, the literature has focused on the role of strategic
complementarities, assuming economic agents to correctly take the signal precision into
account.
Theoretical analysis shows that strategic complementarities induce agents to overreact
to public information, calling into question the desirability of disclosing public informa-
tion, especially when it is not very accurate. Experimental studies have confirmed the
theoretical prediction, although subjects typically overreact to public information to a
smaller extent.
Focusing on fundamental uncertainty, our experiment shows that the response to public
information is mainly driven by the signal precision. This indicates that the response may
deviate from social optimum not solely because of the overreaction due to strategic com-
plementarities, but also because of the overweighting/underweighting of imprecise/precise
information.
Both effects have to be accounted for in combination. When public information is pre-
cise, overreaction can be beneficial as it may help reducing the underweighting associated
13Tests are conducted across periods instead of groups because the number of groups is different between
sessions with r = 0.85 and r = 0.5.
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with the error in stating the first-order expectation. However, when public information is
poorly accurate, overreaction can be detrimental as it may exacerbate the overweighting
already made in the stated first-order expectation.
While a welfare analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, the fact that subjects imper-
fectly take into account the signal precision could lead to reconsider the policy prescription
derived from coordination games with heterogeneous information. Reducing the precision
of public signals in order to mitigate overreaction due to strategic complementarities may
not help aligning agents’ response on the social optimum as they may overweight poorly
accurate signals. By contrast, when public information is inaccurate, it may be better
not to disclose it at all since agents overweight inaccurate signals, even in the absence of
strategic complementarities.
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A Instructions
Instructions to participants varied according to the treatments. We present the instruc-
tions for a treatment with µη = 10 in stage 1, µη = 5 in stage 2 and µη = 20 in stage 3.
For the other treatments, instructions were adapted accordingly and are available upon
request.14
General information
Thank you for participating in an experiment in which you can earn money. These
earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
We ask you not to communicate from now on. If you have a question, then raise your
hand and the instructor will come to you.
You are a group of 18 persons in total participating in this experiment and you are
allocated into three groups of 6 persons. These three groups are totally independent and do
not interact one with another during the whole length of the experiment. Each participant
interacts only with other participants in his group and not with the participants of the
other group. The current instructions describe the rules of the game for a group of 6
participants.
The rules are the same for all the participants. The experiment consists of 3 stages,
each including 10 periods. At each of the 30 periods, you are asked to make two decisions.
Your payoff depends on the decisions you make all along the experiment. The stages differ
from one another by the hints (indicative values) that will be given to you to make your
decisions.
Section A describes how your payoff is calculated at each stage. Sections B, C and D
describe the indicative values you have at stages 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
A - Rule that determines your payoff at each of the 30 periods (3 stages of
10 periods)
Z is an unknown positive number. This unknown positive number is different at each
period but identical for all the participants (of the same group).
At each period, you are asked to make two decisions. Your payoff in ECU (Experimen-
tal Currency Unit) at each period is composed of the payoff associated with your decision
1 and the payoff associated with your decision 2.
Decision 1 On the one hand, your payoff in ECU (Experimental Currency Unit) asso-
ciated with your decision 1 is given by the formula:
200− (yourdecision1− Z)2.
This formula indicates that your payoff gets higher the closer your decision 1 to the
unknown number Z.
14What follows is a translation (from French to English) of the instructions given to the participants.
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Decision 2 On the other hand, your payoff in ECU associated with your decision 2 is
given by the formula:
400−1, 5(yourdecision2−Z)2−8, 5(yourdecision2−averagedecision2ofotherparticipants)2.
This formula indicates that your payoff gets higher the closer your decision 2 to on the
one hand the unknown number Z and on the other hand the average decision of the other
participants.
To maximize your payoff you have to make a decision 2 that is
− as close as possible to the unknown number Z and
− to the decision 2 of the other participants.
Note however that it is more important to be close to the average decision 2 of the
other participants than to the unknown number Z.
No participant knows the true value of Z when making his decisions. However, each
participant receives some hints on the unknown number Z as explained in sections B, C
and D.
B - Your hints on Z during stage 1 (10 periods)
At each period of the first stage, you receive two hints (numbers) on the unknown
number Z to make your decision. These hints contain unknown errors.
− Private hint X drawn from the interval [Z − 10, Z + 10] Each participant
receives at each period a private hint X on the unknown number Z. The private
hints are selected randomly over the error interval [Z − 10, Z + 10]. All the numbers
of this interval have the same probability to be drawn. Your private hint and the
private hint of any of the other participants are selected independently from one
another over the same interval, so that in general each participant receives a
private hint that is different from that of the other participants.
− Common hint Y drawn from the interval [Z−10, Z+10] On top of this private
hint X, you, as well as the other members of your group, receive at each period, a
common hint Y on the unknown number Z. This common hint is also randomly
selected over the interval [Z − 10, Z + 10]. All the numbers of this interval have
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Distinction between private hint X and common hint Y Note that at the first
stage, your private hint X and the common hint Y have the same precision: each is drawn
from the same error interval. The sole distinction between the two hints is that each
participant observes a private hint X that is different from that of the other participants
whereas all the participants observe the same common hint Y.
How to make a decision? As you do not know the errors associated with your
hints, it is natural to choose, as a decision, a number that is between your private hint X
and the common hint Y. To make your decisions, you are asked to select two numbers, by
clicking on a scale that is defined between your private hint X and the common hint Y.
You thus have to choose how to combine your two hints in order to maximize the payoff
associated with your decision 1 and your decision 2.
Once you have chosen each of your decisions 1 and 2, click on the Validate button.
Once all the participants have done the same, a period ends and you are told about the
result of the period. Then a new period starts.
As soon as the 10 periods of the first stage are over, the second stage of the experiment
starts.
C - Your hints on Z during stage 2 (10 periods)
The second stage is different from the first in that the precision of the common hint
increases: it is twice more informative than the private hint on the unknown number
Z.
− Private hint X drawn from the interval [Z-10, Z+10] Each participant receives
at each period a private hint X on the unknown number Z. The private hints are
selected randomly over the error interval [Z-10, Z+10]. All the numbers of this
interval have the same probability to be selected. Your private hint and the private
hint of each other participant are selected independently from one another over the
same interval, so that in general each participant receives a private hint that
is different from that of the other participants.
− Common hint Y drawn from the interval [Z-5, Z+5] On top of this private
hint X, at each period, you receive a common hint Y on the unknown number Z.
This common hint is randomly selected on the interval [Z-5, Z+5]. All the numbers
of this interval have the same probability to be selected. This common hint is the
same for all the participants.
In accordance with stage 1, at each period, you have to make two decisions. The only
difference compared to the first stage is that the common hint is twice more precise than
the private hint.
As soon as the 10 periods of the second stage are over, the third stage of the experiment
starts.
D - Your hints on Z during stage 3 (10 periods)
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At each period of the third stage, you receive two hints on Z to make your decisions.
This time, the common hint is less precise: it is twice less precise than your private
hint on the unknown number Z.
− Private hint X drawn from the interval [Z-10, Z+10] Each participant receives at each
period a private hint X on the unknown number Z. The private hints are selected
randomly over the error interval [Z-10, Z+10]. All the numbers of this interval
have the same probability to be selected. Your private hint and the private hint of
each other participant are selected independently from one another over the same
interval, so that in general each participant receives a private hint that is
different from that of the other participants.
− Common hint Y drawn from the interval [Z-20, Z+20] On top of this private
hint X, at each period, you receive a common hint Y on the unknown number Z.
This common hint is randomly selected on the interval [Z-20, Z+20]. All the
numbers of this interval have the same probability to be selected. This common hint
is the same for all the participants.
In accordance with stage 1, at each period, you have to make two decisions. The only
difference compared to the first stage is that the common hint is twice less precise than
the private hint.
As soon as the 10 periods of the third stage are over, the experiment ends.
You will be told about each change in stage.
Questionnaires:
At the beginning of the experiment, you are asked to fill in an understanding ques-
tionnaire on the computer; when all the participants have responded properly to this
questionnaire, the experiment starts. At the end of the experiment, you are asked to fill
on a personal questionnaire on the computer. All information will remain secret.
Payoffs: At the end of the experiment, the ECUs you have obtained are converted
into Euros and paid in cash. 700 ECUs correspond to 1 Euros.
If you have any question, please ask them at this time.
Thanks for participating in the experiment!
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B Understanding questionnaire
The training questionnaire varied according to the treatments. Each of the 10 following
questions had to be answered by right or wrong, yes or no or multiple choices.
1 During each period of the three stages of the experiment, you always interact with
the same participants.
2 At each period of the three stages, all the participants of the same group receive the
same private hint X.
3 At each period of the three stages, all the participants receive the same common
hint Y.
4 Is it rational to make a decision outside the interval defined by your two hints?
5 Your payoff associated with decision 1 does not depend on the average decision 1 of
the other members of your group.
6 To maximize your payoff associated with your decision 2, it is more important that
your decision 2 is closer to the unknown number Z than the average decision 2 of
the other members of your group.
7 Suppose the value of Z is equal to 143 and the average decision 2 of the other
participants of your group is equal to 133, what will be your payoff in ECU if your
decision 2 is equal to 138: 150? 300? 350?
8 Generally the private hint X is as informative on the average decision 2 of the other
participants as the common hint Y.
9 The difference between stages 1 and 2 is that the common hint Y is more precise
than the private hint X on the unknown number Z.
10 The difference between decision 1 and decision 2 is that the payoff associated with
decision 1 is independent from the decision 1 of the other participants whereas the
payoff associated with decision 2 depends on the decision 2 of the other participants.
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C Example of decision and feedback screens
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